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Monopoly vs. Individual Welfare When a Local Public Good 
is Used to Attract the Creative Class 
Abstract 
We study the decision problems faced by a city authority (CA) who focuses on two 
different objectives in her attempt to attract members of the creative class to her city by providing 
a local public good (LPG). First, we compute the maximum tax that a creative class member is 
willing to pay to enjoy the LPG on offer by living in the CA’s city. Second, assuming that the CA 
acts like a “monopolist” interested in maximizing the total benefit to her city, we determine the 
number of members 𝑁 to attract to her city and the amount of the LPG 𝐿 to provide so that the 
total benefit is maximized. Third, supposing that the CA maximizes the welfare of an individual 
member, we ascertain the values of 𝑁 and 𝐿 that maximize this individual welfare. Finally, we 
compare and contrast the outcomes that arise from the CA’s focus on these two distinct objectives. 
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1. Introduction 
 The eminent physicist Albert Einstein once said that “creativity is contagious, pass it on.” 
The urbanist Richard Florida would, most likely, agree with this statement. Indeed, in his copious 
writings about creative people and creativity---see Florida (2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2014)---
Florida has suggested to students of regional economic development that cities and regions that 
hope to prosper in this age of globalization need to first understand that creativity is contagious 
and then put in place policies that will attract different kinds of creative people who, as it turns 
out, often like to live and work together.  
 In other words, cities and regions need to do all they can to attract and retain members of 
what he calls the creative class. The creative class “consists of people who add economic value 
through their creativity” (Florida, 2002, p. 68). In particular, this class is composed of specialists 
such as engineers, information technology professionals, medical doctors, scientists, university 
professors, and, markedly, bohemians such as artists, musicians, and sculptors.  
 In this paper, we do not quibble with Florida’s central policy prescription stated above but 
concentrate on two questions that follow naturally once one acknowledges Florida’s position about 
the centrality of the creative class for the economic vibrancy of cities. The first question is: “What 
specifically might a city authority (CA) do to attract the creative class?” Since attracting the 
creative class is generally not costless for cities, the second question is: “How many members of 
the creative class should a CA seek to attract?  
 Research by Buettner and Janeba (2016), Batabyal and Beladi (2019), Batabyal et al. 
(2019), and Batabyal and Yoo (2020a, 2020b) has shed light on the first question by pointing out 
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that local public goods (LPGs)3 such as museums, high-quality educational institutions, theatres, 
and public transit can be used by a CA to carry out the “attract” task.4  
 In this regard, Batabyal et al. (2019) study a model in which the creative class members 
are able to migrate between the two cities under study. In this setting, they first delineate the 
equilibrium distribution of the creative class in the two cities and then determine the conditions 
under which the provision of a LPG is efficient. Batabyal and Beladi (2019) build on this work 
and analyze a model of competition between two cities that use a LPG to draw in members of the 
creative class. They follow Batabyal and Beladi (2018) and partition the total creative class 
population into “artists” and “engineers.” They then carry out the remainder of their analysis with 
a representative artist and a representative engineer.  
 Batabyal and Yoo (2020a) demonstrate that the use of a “representative artist and engineer” 
modeling strategy can lead one to focus on an inefficient equilibrium in the combined economy of 
two cities. Finally, Batabyal and Yoo (2020b) also analyze a model with two cities and point out 
that the provision of the LPG in either city is inefficient because the CA is able to choose only the 
optimal amount of the LPG to provide and not, also, the optimal number of creative class members 
to attract to her city.  
 This review of the literature leads to two conclusions. First, some researchers have now 
studied the pros and cons of a CA using a LPG to attract members of the creative class to a city. 
Second, despite the finding in Batabyal and Yoo (2020b) stated in the preceding paragraph, there 
is no research on the question about how many creative class members a CA ought to attract to her 
city when she is able to choose both the number of members to draw in and the quantity of a LPG 
 
3
  
See Hindriks and Myles (2013, chapter 7) for a textbook exposition of LPGs. 
4
  
For a discussion of related matters, see Hansen and Niedomysl (2009), Richardson (2009), and Audretsch and Belitski (2013). 
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to provide. Therefore, our objective in this paper is to use a simple theoretical framework and shed 
light on this question.  
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2.1 delineates our stylized 
model of the interaction between a CA and members of the creative class. Section 2.2 ascertains 
the maximum tax that a creative class member is willing to pay to enjoy the LPG on offer by 
residing in the CA’s city. Section 2.3 first assumes that the CA acts like a “monopolist” interested 
in maximizing the total benefit to her city and then determines the number of members 𝑁 to attract 
to her city and the amount of the LPG 𝐿 to provide so that this total benefit is maximized. Section 
2.4 first supposes that the CA maximizes the welfare of an individual member and then ascertains 
the values of 𝑁 and 𝐿 that maximize this individual welfare. Section 2.5 compares and contrasts 
the outcomes that arise from the CA’s focus on the two distinct objectives studied in sections 2.3 
and 2.4. Finally, section 3 concludes and then suggests four ways in which the research delineated 
in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Preliminaries 
 Batabyal and Yoo (2020b) rightly point out that the creative class, in general, is made up 
of an assortment of specialists such as bankers, engineers, medical doctors, sculptors, university 
professors, and is therefore heterogeneous. That said, a city that is looking to bring together 
members of the creative class is generally not looking to bring together every possible type of 
member. In other words, a city like New York is more likely to be interested in attracting bankers 
and, in contrast, a city like Los Angeles is probably more interested in drawing in film industry 
professionals. In addition, even if a CA wanted to attract multiple types of creative class members 
to her city, it is difficult to believe that she would be able to do so by offering a single LPG.  
6 
 
 Hence, to focus our ensuing discussion, we suppose that a CA is looking to attract a 
particular subset of members of the creative class such as bankers or sculptors. Because these 
members are either all bankers or all sculptors, and so and so forth, we can think of this subset as 
a homogeneous set of individuals.  
Now, consider a city with a CA. We denote the LPG that is provided by this CA to the 
relevant creative class members by 𝐿. We assume that 𝑁 ≥ 1 creative class members live in this 
city. The income possessed by any one creative class member is 𝐼 > 0. When a specific creative 
class member, attracted by the LPG on offer, decides to live in this city and the CA provides 𝐿 to 
the 𝑁 members who live in the city, this individual member obtains utility 𝑈 denoted by the 
function 
    𝑈 = {𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁} + 𝐼 − 𝜏,     (1) 
where 𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 > 0, 𝛾 > 0, and 𝜏 > 0 is the maximum tax that a creative class member who lives 
in the city is willing to pay to enjoy the LPG on offer. This creative class member’s reservation 
utility, i.e., the utility he obtains if he chooses to not live in the city under study is 𝐼.  
 Inspecting equation (1), we see that an individual creative class member’s utility is (i) 
increasing in both the quantity of the LPG or 𝐿 that is provided and in his personal income 𝐼, (ii) 
decreasing in the maximum tax 𝜏 that he has to pay, and (iii) decreasing in the number of creative 
class members 𝑁 that are living in the city. This last property captures the idea that when a sculptor, 
for instance, is deciding whether to pay the tax 𝜏 for the LPG offered by the CA and live in this 
city, he takes into account how many other sculptors there already are and too many sculptors 
make the city “congested with sculptors” and hence attenuates his utility.5 
 
5
  
This way of modeling the impact of the number of members in certain creative class professions living in cities is consistent with 
the way in which the popular press has described such professions. To give two examples, Hughes (2011) points out that there are 
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 With this description of the theoretical framework out of the way,6 our next task is to 
ascertain the maximum tax that a creative class member is willing to pay to enjoy the LPG on offer 
by residing in the CA’s city. 
2.2. The tax  
An arbitrary member of the creative class will agree to live in the city under study if and 
only if his utility from doing so is at least as big as not doing so or his reservation utility. 
Mathematically, this means that the maximum tax levied by the CA on this creative class member 
must satisfy the inequality  
    
{𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁} + 𝐼 − 𝜏 ≥ 𝐼.      (2) 
 Rewriting the inequality in (2) in order to isolate the tax 𝜏, we get 
    
{𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁} ≥ 𝜏.       (3) 
From (3), it should be clear to the reader that the maximum tax that a creative class member will 
be willing to pay to live in the city under study is 
    𝜏 = {𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁}.       (4) 
Inspecting equation (4), it is straightforward to verify two points. First, the higher the amount of 
the LPG or 𝐿 that is provided by the CA, the greater is the maximum tax that any creative class 
member is willing to pay. Second, the larger the number of creative class members living in this 
city, the greater is the congestion factor we alluded to in section 2.1 and hence the lower is the 
maximum tax that an arbitrary creative class member is willing to pay.  
 
very many lawyers in Washington DC and Russell (2019) contends that the number of “tech workers” in San Francisco is not only 
large but also growing. That said, equation (1) can also be thought of as denoting a public good with a congestion effect. 
6
  
Our modeling of the LPG or 𝐿 provision problem has some similarities with aspects of the literature on the provision of club goods. 
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 We now proceed to analyze a setting in which the CA acts like a “monopolist” and chooses 
the LPG 𝐿 and the number of members 𝑁 to attract to her city to maximize the total benefit accruing 
to the city from these two optimal choices.  
2.3. Monopoly 
 Before we compute the total benefit to the CA, we’ll need to specify what it costs her to 
provide the LPG 𝐿 to the creative class members. To this end, we suppose that it costs the CA 𝐿 +𝑁 to provide the LPG and thereby “run” her city. With this cost specification, the total benefit 𝐵 
to the CA is given by  
    𝐵 = 𝜏𝑁 − {𝐿 + 𝑁}.       (5) 
We now substitute the value of 𝜏 from equation (4) into equation (5). This gives us 
    𝐵 = 𝑁{𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁} − {𝐿 + 𝑁}.     (6) 
The CA chooses 𝐿 and 𝑁 to maximize the total benefit function given by equation (6).7 
 Differentiating the maximand in equation (6) with respect to 𝐿 and 𝑁 gives us the two first-
order necessary conditions for a maximum.8 These two conditions are  
 
    
𝜕𝐵𝜕𝐿 = 𝛽𝑁 − 1 = 0       (7) 
 
7
  
Our modeling strategy in this paper involves the use of linear functional forms for the utility function and the cost of providing the 
LPG. We use linear functional forms because of three reasons. First, our paper is fundamentally about the use of LPGs and it is 
very common to use either linear or quasi-linear functional forms to model both utility and cost in the extant literature on public 
goods. In other words, there are several precedents for the use of linear functional forms in this literature. See Frank (2010) and 
Postlewaite (2018) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. Second, the use of linear functional forms allows us to obtain 
explicit solutions for the two key decision variables---𝐿 and 𝑁---that we care about in this paper. Finally, because we use linear 
functional forms, we are able to compare the outcomes that arise in the “Monopoly” and the “Individual welfare” cases in section 
2.5 below in a manner that is transparent and hence easy to comprehend. These three reasons notwithstanding, we acknowledge 
that linear functional forms, if not used carefully, can give rise to either corner solutions or to indeterminate solutions. Specifically, 
this can happen when one part of an objective function is linear and another part is, say, multiplicative. To see this concretely, if 
were to replace the linear and additive LPG provision cost of 𝐿 + 𝑁 with the multiplicative form 𝐿 ∙ 𝑁 then algebra shows that we 
get 𝛽 = 1 and, inter alia, the value of 𝑁 is indeterminate. 
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We obtain 𝜕2𝐵 𝜕𝐿2⁄ = 0 ≤ 0 and 𝜕2𝐵 𝜕𝑁2 = −2𝛾 < 0⁄  and hence the second-order necessary conditions are satisfied. 
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and 
 
    
𝜕𝐵𝜕𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 2𝛾𝑁 − 1 = 0.     (8) 
 
Simplifying equations (7) and (8) gives us the optimal values of the LPG or 𝐿∗ and the number of 
members attracted to the city or 𝑁∗. We get  
 
    𝐿∗ = 2𝛾+𝛽{1−𝛼}𝛽2        (9) 
 
and 
 
    𝑁∗ = 1𝛽.        (10) 
 
 Recall from equation (1) that the marginal utility to a creative class member from an 
incremental increase in the number of members resident in the city or 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑁 = −𝛾 < 0.⁄  Also, 
from equation (9) we infer that 𝜕𝐿∗ 𝜕𝛾 > 0.⁄  Therefore, putting these two pieces of information 
together, we see that the total benefit maximizing level of the LPG or 𝐿∗ is an increasing function 
of the absolute value of the marginal utility arising from a small increase in the number of members 
living in the city.  
 Similarly, from equation (1) we know that the marginal utility to a creative class member 
from an incremental increase in the amount of the LPG that is provided or 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐿 = 𝛽 > 0.⁄  
Straightforward differentiation of equation (9) tells us that  
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𝜕𝐿∗𝜕𝛽 = 𝛼𝛽−𝛽−4𝛾𝛽3 .       (11) 
 
Inspecting equation (11) we see that an increase in the marginal utility from the LPG increases the 
optimal amount of the LPG or 𝐿∗ that is provided by the CA if 𝛼𝛽 > (𝛽 + 4𝛾).  
 Finally, equation (10) tells us that an increase in the marginal utility from the LPG or 𝛽 
lowers the total benefit maximizing number of creative class members attracted by the CA to the 
city under study. We now study a setting in which the CA focuses on the welfare of an individual 
creative class member and then ascertains the values of 𝑁 and 𝐿 that maximize this individual 
welfare. 
2.4. Individual welfare 
In contrast to section 2.3, we now suppose that the CA concentrates on the welfare of an 
individual member and then ascertains the values of 𝑁 and 𝐿 that maximize this individual welfare. 
The cost of providing the LPG and thereby “running” her city is now shared equally by all the 
resident creative class members who are assumed to have identical preferences. This means that 
the charge levied upon a member living in the city is {𝐿 + 𝑁} 𝑁.⁄  With this cost description, our 
CA selects 𝐿 and 𝑁 to maximize 
 
    𝑈 = {𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛾𝑁} + 𝐼 − 𝐿+𝑁𝑁 .     (12) 
 
The first-order necessary conditions for an optimum are9  
 
 
9
  
We get 𝜕2𝑈 𝜕𝐿2 = 0 ≤ 0⁄  and 𝜕2𝑈 𝜕𝑁2 = −2𝐿 𝑁3 < 0⁄⁄  and therefore the second-order necessary conditions are satisfied. 
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𝜕𝑈𝜕𝐿 = 𝛽 − 1𝑁 = 0       (13) 
 
and 
 
    
𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑁 = 𝐿𝑁2 − 𝛾 = 0.       (14) 
 
 Simplifying equations (13) and (14), we see that optimality calls for setting  
 
    𝐿∗ = 𝛾𝛽2        (15) 
 
and 
 
    𝑁∗ = 1𝛽.        (16) 
 
Our final task in this paper is to compare and contrast the results of this individual welfare 
maximization case with the corresponding results obtained in the “monopoly” case analyzed in 
section 2.3. 
2.5. Monopoly vs. individual welfare 
 From equation (15), we see that as in section 2.3, the individual welfare maximizing level 
of the LPG or 𝐿∗ is an increasing function of the absolute value of the marginal utility arising from 
a small increase in the number of members living in the city or 𝛾. Second, equation (15) tells us 
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that unlike the case studied in section 2.3, an increase in the marginal utility from the LPG or 𝛽 
unambiguously reduces the optimal amount of the LPG or 𝐿∗ that is provided by the CA.  
 Next, comparing equations (10) and (16), we see that the optimal number of creative class 
members who are attracted to and live in the city under study or 𝑁∗ is the same irrespective of 
whether the CA maximizes the total benefit to the city or the welfare of an individual creative class 
member.  
 Finally, comparing equations (9) and (15), we confirm that unlike the above result for 𝑁∗, 
the optimal amount of the LPG or 𝐿∗ that is provided by the CA is not the same in the total benefit 
and individual welfare maximization cases. In particular, 𝐿∗ does depend on which objective 
function the CA chooses to optimize. In this regard, simple algebra shows that the amount of the 
LPG provided when the CA behaves like a “monopolist” is greater than the amount provided when 
she focuses on individual welfare maximization as long as 𝛾 > {𝛼 − 1}𝛽. This concludes our 
discussion of total benefit vs. individual welfare maximization when a CA uses a LPG to attract 
members of the creative class to her city.  
3. Conclusions 
In this paper, we studied the decision problems faced by a city authority (CA) who focused 
on two different objectives in her attempt to attract members of the creative class to her city by 
providing a local public good (LPG). First, we computed the maximum tax that a creative class 
member was willing to pay to enjoy the LPG on offer by living in the CA’s city. Second, assuming 
that the CA acted like a “monopolist” interested in maximizing the total benefit to her city, we 
determined the number of members 𝑁 to attract to her city and the amount of the LPG 𝐿 to provide 
so that this total benefit is maximized. Third, supposing that the CA concentrated on the welfare 
of an individual member, we ascertained the values of 𝑁 and 𝐿 that maximized this individual 
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welfare. Finally, we compared and contrasted the outcomes that arose from the CA’s focus on 
these two distinct objectives.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
four potential extensions: First, it would be interesting to model the interaction between a CA and 
creative class members in an intertemporal setting and to then analyze the time-paths of the optimal 
amount of the LPG that is provided and the optimal number of members that are attracted to the 
city. Second, it would also be informative to partition the creative class population into different 
clusters and to then examine how successful a CA is in attracting these different clusters of 
members to her city with a LPG and other fiscal policy instruments such as tax breaks and 
subsidies. Third, one could analyze the interaction between a CA and creative class members as in 
Oladi (2005). Finally, with regard to the analysis in section 2.4, one could follow the approach in 
Beladi et al. (2014) and examine a situation in which the resident creative class members have 
heterogeneous preferences. Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem will 
provide additional insights into the nature of the static and the intertemporal dealings between 
creative class members and city authorities.  
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